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Abstract
This article discusses the political role of the Olympic Games and its implications on the hosting country’s 
political and social life by analysing two cases—South Korea (1988) and Mexico (1968). Contrary to 
the belief that the games were created as an event that transcends politics, this study concludes that 
Olympic Games have been and are used as a political tool for various purposes and specific political 
circumstances eventually influenced the selection of Mexico’s and South Korea’s priorities for national 
development. Moreover, the findings of this article demonstrate that the Olympic Games served as 
a catalyst accelerating democratic changes in South Korea, and this finding can be applied to heuristic 
analysis of the future Olympic Games.
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When the International Olympic Committee (IOC) granted the right to host the 19th summer Olympic 
Games to Mexico City, it immediately proved to be a controversial decision. First, the choice of Mexico 
City to host the 1968 Olympics was a controversial one because of the city’s high altitude, 2,300 m, 
which meant that the air contained 30 per cent less oxygen than at sea level (IOC 2010). Second, it was 
the first time the Olympic Games were to be held in Latin America and the first time, too, in a country 
which was considered to still be in the process of achieving full economic development. Inevitably, 
questions about Mexico and Mexico City’s readiness and ability to host the games were raised and 
discussed. 
Likewise, on 30 September 1981 at the 84th IOC meeting in Baden-Baden, West Germany, the capital 
of South Korea, Seoul, was awarded the right to host the 1988 Olympic Games, an event which has been 
regarded as an unexpected decision, since the only other competitor for the 1988 Olympic Games was 
Nagoya, located in Japan, the economic superpower. While this decision left many Koreans proud and 
excited, a number of people expressed deep concerns about South Korea’s readiness and ability to 
successfully host the games. For example, hosting the Olympic Games would require enormous funds. 
Could this become an excessive burden for Korea’s economy and its people? How would North Korea 
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react on South Korea hosting the games? Moreover, if hosting the Olympic Games had political 
undertones, would these bear negative or positive consequences on the development of Korean politics? 
These were some of the same questions that were being asked in regards to the Mexico Olympic Games 
of 1968 twenty years earlier. 
Looking at the experiences of previous Olympic hosts, it is reasonable to assume that modern Olympic 
Games have grown beyond the sports dimension into a competition dynamic to display the national 
strength of the participant countries as well as serve as an opportunity for political, economic, diplomatic 
and social exchanges. Consequently, the significance of the Olympic Games has become truly diversified. 
Additionally, multicultural performances, of which the Olympic Games serve as global exemplar, appear 
to offer particularly significant loci of research and interpretation in the modern globalised world. The 
findings of this article could further be used to examine the political significance of the Olympic 
Games. 
The Mexico City and Seoul Olympiads, prepared with great excitement, determination and dedication 
by the nationals of the respective countries, are deemed by the historians as some of the most successful 
Olympic Games and are considered to have greatly exceeded expectations, especially regarding athletic 
achievements. Within their time frames, these games were the largest in Olympic history with the 
participation of more countries and athletes than ever before. Moreover, by transcending prejudices and 
contributing to East–West harmony, the Olympics of 1988 are thought to have helped promote détente 
worldwide (Kim 1985: 67).
It has been argued that hosting the Olympic Games affects the ongoing economic, political and social 
processes in the host country. The Mexico City and Seoul Olympic Games, because they were held when 
Mexico and South Korea were on the verge of developing into advanced societies, have allegedly had a 
significant impact on the economics, politics and societies of these nations. However, the questions of 
precisely what kinds of changes the Mexico City and Seoul Olympic Games have brought about in 
Mexico and South Korea still remain. Therefore, the primary purpose of this article is to analyse what 
role the hosting of the Olympic Games of 1968 and 1988 played on political processes in Mexico and 
South Korea. Due to the space limitations, other important areas such as diplomacy, security, foreign 
relations and economics, while no less important, will not be examined in this study. Comparing these 
cases will provide an interesting appraisal of the role of the Olympic Games and can serve for the future 
heuristic analysis of interconnection between Olympics and politics. 
Interpretation of Olympic Legacy 
The Olympic movement has its roots in ancient Greece and dates back to the ninth century BC when the 
athletes, artists and their families, as well as pilgrims, could travel in complete safety to participate in or 
attend the Olympic Games (IOC 2010). The modern Olympic Games were revived by Pierre de Coubertin 
whose ideas and commitment were extraordinary. His main concern was educational reform and, 
therefore, he frequently traveled to England and the US where he noticed the growing enthusiasm for 
sports. He envisioned the potential of combining that passion with the spirit of the ancient Greek 
Olympics. From the beginning, Coubertin stressed how the Olympic Games could bring social reform, 
mutual understanding and world peace. Emphasis on internationalism rather than cosmopolitanism, 
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peaceful coexistence despite differences among the nations and respect for others are the bedrock of 
Coubertin’s aspirations. 
In theory, the Olympic Games provide an excellent opportunity for promoting idealistic values as the 
goal of the Olympic Movement is ‘to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating 
people through sport practiced without discrimination of any kind’ (ibid.). Ideally, these games are to be 
the antithesis of politics, whereby the athletes of the world come together in the Olympic land for those 
two weeks of the games. However, it is highly arguable whether Olympic Games have stood untainted 
by politics.
The recent history of the Olympic Games has been prolific in athletic achievement, yet richer still in 
political confrontation and even fatal violence. The following events show the dismal connotations of the 
Olympic Games: 1968—students repressed in the streets of Mexico City; 1972—the murder of Israeli 
athletes by Palestinian terrorists in Munich; 1976—20 African nations boycott the games in Montreal; 
1980—the US among other Western bloc nations, protesting the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, 
boycotts the games in Moscow; 1984—the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc nations boycott the games in 
Los Angeles (Flanagan 1988a: 89). These examples illustrate the politicisation of the Olympic Games 
and their use as an instrument of foreign policy (Flanagan 1988b: 85). Moreover, the ubiquitous concerns 
about the wider political implications of the Olympic Games overshadow the idealistic essence of the 
games. The Olympic Games, envisioned as an event that transcends politics, have become a fantasy that 
has never occurred. 
Most Olympiads, including the very first in 1896, had some sort of political overtones swirling around 
it (CNN 2002). This clearly contradicts what Avery Brundage, the former president of the IOC, said: 
‘Sports is completely free of politics’ (Goldberg 2000: 63). Brundage’s apolitical vision appears to be 
based on a romanticised conception that ignores the larger political context in which sports operate. 
Governments have recognised the political importance of athletic success as well as the value of pro-
moting the health and well-being of its citizenry. Accordingly, sports have become a diplomatic tool, as 
governments have used boycotts, sports propagandising, denial of visas, sports assistance, hosting of 
Olympics and sports exchanges to further political aims (ibid.). A vivid example of political Olympic 
Games is the Berlin or Nazi Olympiad of 1936, after which virtually every Olympiad has been interpreted 
in political terms. The games can serve as a political instrument in the hands of politicians and the IOC 
that can also exploit politicians to position the Olympic movement as it sees fit. 
How efficient the games are as a means of political manipulation remains questionable. There are 
positive impacts of the Olympic Games as they attempt to carry an irenic message. To assess the role of 
the games in the political processes taking place in Mexico and South Korea, I will examine the circum-
stances in which these countries found themselves before the Olympic Games took place and what was 
the impact of the games, if any. I will first examine the Mexico case and then I will progress to South 
Korea before making concluding comments.
Mexico and the Development of Politics
Mexico achieved independence from Spain in 1821. In 1910 the Epic Revolution began, triggered by the 
unrest amongst peasants and urban workers, who were led by Emiliano Zapata, and a new constitution 
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was subsequently approved in 1917 (Foster 1997: 139). Since 1929, the Mexican people lived under a 
political system controlled by the leaders of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the official 
party that dominated for about 70 years. While the system permitted the election of opposition leaders to 
Congress, the official party had won all state governorships and an overwhelming majority of municipal 
elections until June 1989 (Gil 1992: 2). Gil (1992: 20) describes the political situation of Mexico as the 
one where ‘the ruling party is the sole transmitter of ideology, the consciousness of the party impels it to 
act as a vanguard; it therefore decides on all affairs from the top and these decisions are binding’. It 
should be noted, however, that the Mexican system did not create gulags for dissidents nor did it send 
them to exile. It did create an administrative-political system by which policy initiation always came 
from top. 
In addition, Mexico’s economic development contributed to the already existing social problems in 
the country. Mexico experienced rapid economic growth in the late 1960s. While in 1967 Latin America 
as a whole had failed to achieve the 2.5 per cent increase in per capita gross national product, Mexico 
had achieved an increase of 3.8 per cent (Hofstadter 1974: 118). In what is referred to as the ‘Mexican 
Miracle’, the economy grew by an average of 6 per cent annually between 1940 and 1980, thus fueling 
urban and industrial employment and swelling the ranks of PRI-controlled unions on the strength of 
wage contracts that the government permitted them to negotiate (Gil 1992: 29). The ‘Mexican Miracle’ 
aggravated the already skewed distribution of economic rewards in the 1950s and increased political 
discontent (Suchlicki 2001: 138). Social progress was sacrificed for economic progress and, while 
industrialisation and modernisation—primarily of Mexico City and other major urban areas—had 
advanced significantly, land distribution, health and educational programmes lagged behind. Poverty 
remained a major problem and the gap between rich and poor seemed as wide as ever.
Olympic Factor in Mexico
The economic growth in Mexico was exceptional. It was noted that ‘The nation’s economy has made 
such strides that economists point to Mexico as an example for other underdeveloped countries’ (Paz 
1972: 13). In order to gain international recognition of its transformation into a modern country, Mexico 
requested, and was granted, the designation of its capital as the site of the 1968 Olympic Games. As 
indicated by government economists, the summer Olympics were expected to produce a major increase 
in national earning from tourism (Hofstadter 1974: 119). Moreover, the Mexican government hoped to 
find a global forum to show off the nation’s miraculous economic progress and, therefore, the assumption 
was that, side by side with the games, a cultural Olympics showcasing Mexican art would add to the 
nation’s prestige (Foster 1997: 199). According to Houlihan (1994: 121), for Mexico the games offered 
the opportunity to project as a modernising and stable North American country and to shed its Third 
World debt-ridden image.
When the IOC accepted Mexico’s bid to host the summer games in 1968, the whole world was 
informed that the Olympiad was to be held in Latin America and in a developing country for the first 
time. The challenge for Mexico was evident, for the Japanese had done a superb job in 1964 and it was 
incumbent upon the Mexicans to match their effort. Athletes, trainers, representatives of the press and 
hundreds of thousands of visitors from the entire world would descend on Mexico and subject it to 
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scrutiny. The criticism that the costs were exorbitant for a country such as Mexico were fended off by 
administration spokesmen who argued that not only would visitors leave behind tens of millions of 
dollars but the facilities themselves would be put to good use once the Olympic torch was extinguished. 
Consequently, the party and the president were placing their prestige on the line and would not tolerate 
setbacks (Meyer et al. 2003: 639). The country, they insisted, would show itself as a prosperous and 
stable republic. 
While many Mexicans felt proud of the opportunity to host the Olympic Games, a large number of 
citizens remained sceptical about it and accused government officials of wasting resources. Thus, many 
Mexicans believed that the government favoured programmes designed to ‘Show Mexicans and all the 
world that Mexico is “modernizing,” while doing little about one of the world’s most critical problems 
of industrially caused air pollution in the capital city and when thousands of people go begging to live 
on mere subsistence incomes’ (Johnson 1971: 4). As we can see, the decision to host the Olympiad 
became controversial even before the games began and more troubles were to follow.
Domestic Unrest
The most severe opposition to the government surfaced in form of civil disturbances in Mexico City 
during July–October 1968. Undeniably, the popular discontent had gradually been growing in Mexico. 
One scholar calls the 1960s as the years of ‘sudden awakening from a dream, from the illusion of genuine 
prosperity and social harmony’ (Poniatowska 1975: xiv). The years of 1960s and particularly 1968 
revealed the other face of ‘modern’ Mexico—a generation of angry young men and women and a middle 
class which bitterly opposed the political system that had ruled the country for 40 years. In addition to 
that, during the 1960s, worldwide student demonstrations and discontent affected Mexican students. The 
Cuban revolution, the US involvement in Vietnam and Soviet expansionist policies contributed to student 
protest and activism. Domestic sources of unhappiness included a decreased faith in the PRI and its 
leadership, as well as increasing dissatisfaction with the economic model that, despite significant growth, 
had failed to resolve the problems of poverty, the imbalances between rural and urban areas and wide-
spread illiteracy (Suchlicki 2001: 141).
It is worth mentioning that globally also, the year 1968 turned out to be extremely important from a 
political point of view. The People’s Republic of China found itself in the midst of the Cultural Revolu-
tion; the attempt to liberalise Czechoslovakia was crushed by Soviet troops; the French government was 
caught up in student demonstrations; and throughout the US, peace and civil rights demonstrations 
were taking place. It is, therefore, not surprising that student protests in Mexico found a fertile ground 
in 1968. 
Student Unrests 
The trouble began almost innocently in July 1968 with a fight between the students of two Mexico City 
schools. After the principal of one school called for police help, the grenaderos, a despised paramilitary 
riot force came and brutally beat the students. The grenaderos stopped the fight but in the process 
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‘politicized a large portion of the student population in Mexico City’ (Meyer et al. 2003: 640). A few 
days later, as leftist students gathered to celebrate the 26 July anniversary of the Cuban revolution, they 
met the grenaderos again, and a full-scale riot ensued. 
August 1968 saw a growing student movement. As city workers were putting the finishing touches on 
the various construction projects, tensions between the students and the government reached the breaking 
point. Massive demonstrations were held on the campuses of the National University and the National 
Polytechnic Institute, and a National Student Strike Committee was formed. As the repressions became 
more severe and the hostility of the press, radio and television—almost all pro-government—increased, 
the movement strengthened and expanded. Octavio Paz refers to the students as ‘the spokesmen of the 
people, and more precisely, not the spokesmen of a certain class but of the collective conscience’ (Paz 
1972: 13). This ‘conscience’ wanted the end of the rule of privilege initiated by the PRI 40 years ago. 
Many other people, small businessmen, workers, Catholics and intellectuals joined the antigovernment 
movements. A list of demands stressed tensions: students insisted that all political prisoners be released, 
that the chief of police be fired, that the grenaderos be disbanded and that the law of ‘social dissolution’ 
be repealed. On 27 August, the National Student Strike Committee organised the largest organised anti-
government demonstration in Mexican history—an estimated half million people participated. Donald 
Hodges calls the student movement ‘a protest of emergent middle sectors against excesses of a fattened 
ruling class, unreachable and satisfied in its stability, a protest against the closure and rigidity of the 
political system’ (Hodges and Gandy 2002: 102).
Students strongly felt that hosting the Olympic Games in a country where welfare policies were not 
efficiently carried out was not only a waste of resources but also a misguided economic policy (Hoon 
1989: 24). Moreover, foreign political experts and the media joined a growing consensus in openly 
criticising the Mexico Olympics for being held in a country with a long history of authoritarian rule 
(Choi 2002). Student leaders spoke frequently about the paradoxical contrast between the heavy ex-
penditures for the games and the poverty in which most Mexicans dwelt. On repeated occasions, before 
large audiences, they insisted that the incumbent elite was spending too much for circuses and not enough 
for bread (Stevens 1974: 223). Students saw the regime pursuing its own self-aggrandisement via inter-
national image-building while the masses did without.
They also said the government should never have invited the Olympic Committee to hold the games 
in Mexico but, having committed the initial error, should have realised the magnitude of the commitment 
and retracted the invitation. While condemning Mexico’s participation, the student leaders—at least in 
public—reiterated that they did not advocate student action for the purpose of obstructing the Olympic 
Games (ibid.). On the other hand, they saw no reason as to why they should not take advantage of the 
leverage provided by the situation to try to pressure the government into making concessions before the 
capital city would be flooded with foreign observers and athletes. Some student speakers were impatient 
with this moderate stance and called for more militant action to prevent the Olympics (ibid.).
Government’s Response and the Massacre
Only a month before the commencement of the Olympic Games, the president alluded to the importance 
of the Olympic Games: ‘We trust that the imminent sports events will not be prevented from occurring 
and … we will use all legal methods at out disposal in order to maintain order and internal peace so that 
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citizens and visitors receive all necessary guarantees’ (Hodges 2002: 98). President Diaz-Ordaz was a 
zealous defender of the ‘Mexican Miracle’ and the then 30-year-old, one-party regime of the PRI. Nearly 
three decades of accelerated industrialisation and modern tourist resorts had fueled the Mexican elite’s 
hopes of attaining first-world status. Yet behind that postcard image, explosive social tensions had 
accumulated. During the previous decade, the government increasingly turned to the army to suppress 
social movements. Striking railroad workers nationwide, peasants demanding land distribution in 
Morelos, teachers clamouring for democracy in Sonora and other states—all felt the point of the army’s 
bayonets (Suchlicki 2001: 141). 
As we saw earlier, the 1968 Olympics were to be the crowning jewel of the ‘Mexican Miracle’, show-
casing the country to the world. Two hundred million dollars were transferred from social services to 
spruce up Mexico City for the first-ever Olympics to be staged in a developing country. Unsurprisingly, 
in his annual state of the union speech Diaz Ordaz maintained that he would not allow the students to 
disrupt the games. He stated that foreigners whom he implied to be Cuban agents were hoping to destroy 
the Olympics (Johnson 1971: 155). He also pointed to speeches made by radical students who favoured 
disrupting the opening ceremony of the games and alleged a conspiracy by the students to sabotage the 
Olympics. Likewise, the hard-liners in the Diaz-Ordaz administration insisted that the student movement 
constituted a threat to the impending Olympics and to the stability of the whole Mexican state.
In response to the student protests, the PRI-controlled Congress invested Diaz-Ordaz with extra-
ordinary powers to deploy the army. On 18 September, troops invaded the National University with 
bayonets drawn and arrested virtually the entire leadership of the strike committee. Combat troops fired 
bazooka bombs against the 400-year-old gate of San Ildefonso school, a national art treasure. A virtual 
state of siege ensued and many demonstrators were murdered. 
Then, 10 days before the Olympics opened, thousands of students gathered in Mexico City’s Tlatelolco 
Plaza to protest the government’s lavish expenditures on the Olympics and to demand freedom for 
student and political prisoners. They were murdered in cold blood by army platoons and white-gloved 
paramilitary squads. Reuters put the number of dead at 337. However, the true count may never be 
known as the soldiers took away the corpses. Thousands more were arrested and battered and more than 
200 student leaders were tortured and jailed. Exact details of this incident remain unclear because of the 
conflicting reports. Government officials accused students of instigating the bloodshed while the students 
blamed the government troops and police. City workers immediately scrubbed the Plaza clean of blood-
stains and the newspapers claimed that a small rally had gotten out of hand, nothing more. Still, the 
killings shocked the IOC. Chairman Avery Brundage called a secret emergency meeting, which fell just 
one vote short of cancelling the games.
The Mexican government has been reluctant to provide details about this massacre which further 
stymies the efforts to find the truth. However, it is not the purpose of this study to analyse the details of 
that horrible night. Suffice it to say, that many people were brutally murdered by the troops and police 
and many more were arrested.
Mexico: Conclusion
The government succeeded in quashing the popular upheaval in Tlatelolco. What remained of the Student 
Strike Committee declared an Olympic truce. The games took place as scheduled and were a great 
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success, attracting many favourable comments in the world press, especially in regard to the Mexican 
government’s efficient handling of the logistic problems involved in housing, feeding, transporting and 
entertaining the thousands of athletes and spectators. The only dissident voices the world heard were the 
raised fists of Tommie Smith and John Carlos on the Olympic podium; they were the African-American 
athletes who raised a black-gloved fist and hung their heads when their country’s national anthem was 
played thus making an act of racial protest. ‘That was the only thing that gave the Olympics some sense,’ 
said a 1968 student in Elena Poniatowska’s Massacre in Mexico. In using their Olympic triumph as a 
political weapon, the gold medalists deeply impressed Mexican spectators and became heroes to the 
Mexican movement.
The massacre at Tlatelolco did affect society. Writers and intellectuals vociferously criticised the 
president and the political system. The massacre also spurred the growth of opposition from the left and 
the right. Criticism was more readily tolerated. After all, the massacre had undermined ‘the myth of 
revolution and its attendant promises of progressive socioeconomic achievements and political justice’ 
(Gil 1992: 39). However, it was difficult to alter the ossified institutions of governance because the PRI 
was the Mexican government.
It was not until three decades after Tlatelolco that the situation in Mexico changed—in the 1997 elec-
tions, the opposition triumphed in Congress and Mexico City, two crucial pillars of the authoritarian 
regime, changing forever the Mexican political landscape. It is, therefore, tempting to argue that the 
Olympic Games did not precipitate any political changes in Mexico and were a purely athletic event. 
However, this study contends that 19th Mexico City Olympic Games have had strong political over-
tones inasmuch as the Olympic Games were expected to provide a dramatic impetus for national develop-
ment, namely, to promote national prestige, improve economy and to continue one-party rule. With this 
backdrop, the government attempted to appease the protests of students and intellectuals and to maintain 
political stability. The Mexican government attempted to use the ‘Olympic instrument’ to achieve the 
political objective of showcasing national development to legitimise and prolong the rule of the govern-
ing party and enhance national prestige. The government succeeded in hosting an excellent athletic event 
but at the same time failed to achieve its political objectives, mainly due to the opposition from the 
students. As we can see, the Mexico Olympic Games were not utilised to stimulate national development 
and that hosting the Olympic Games can spark political instability. As Dan Hofstadter has put it, ‘out of 
the big uproar the forbidden question came out—If Mexico could afford the Olympics, could it not 
afford free politics?’ (Hofstadter 1974: 116).
Korea and the Development of Politics
In spring 1988, the American ambassador to Korea spoke of Korea in the following terms:
The political transition affects every corner of Korean society, as people search for ways to translate the concept 
of democracy into reality in school, workplace, and every kinds of organization… The Seoul Olympic Games 
symbolize Korea’s new place in the world community. (Kim 1989: 754) 
Officially, Korea did not link the hosting of the Olympics to domestic stability or political development. 
After being awarded the 1988 Olympics, the South Korean government loudly and widely proclaimed 
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that a major purpose of the games was to help catapult the nation into the ranks of the advanced, in-
dustrialised nations of the world (Larson 2010). Arguably, it wanted to confirm that status through 
successful hosting of the games and the attendant media coverage.
When Seoul was awarded the 1988 Olympic Games in 1981, the main objective of the Seoul Olympics 
was to further the economic development of South Korea, display national strength, consolidate ties of 
friendship with countries all over the world, create the proper atmosphere for establishing diplomatic 
relations with socialist and non-aligned countries and solidify national unity (Lim 2010). In other words, 
the government intended to use the games to pursue diplomatic, social and economic development. The 
South Korean government and the ruling party publicised the Olympic Games as the largest festival in 
South Korean history while emphasising that the games should provide an opportunity to achieve national 
harmony.
Nevertheless, the government of the Fifth Republic, the official host of the 1988 Olympic Games, had 
fallen in deep crisis. First, there was legitimacy crisis, rooted in the fact that the Fifth Republic main-
tained its rule through an undemocratic process which brought about an inflexible political situation, 
intensified the rigidity of system and caused the regimentation of opposition forces calling for demo-
cratisation. Additionally, the overall crisis was exacerbated by the repercussions of Kwangju uprising 
and the confrontational nature of South–North relations. Furthermore, radical students and opposition 
forces began to criticise the ruling party for using the Olympic Games to prolong party.
The Turbulence in Politics in the Beginning of 1980s
After the collapse of Park Chung-Hee’s system in October 1979, a group of hard-line military officers 
led by General Chun seized control of the armed forces on 12 December in a bloody night-time coup, 
thus checking any transition towards democratisation (Kim 1989: 759). On 17 May 1980, Chun’s new 
government declared martial law throughout South Korea, bringing an abrupt end to the short-lived 
movement for democracy. The following day students and citizens of Kwangju protested martial law in 
street demonstrations that almost escalated into an armed revolt. On 26 May Chun requested General 
Wickham to release the Korean Army’s 20th division to put down the rebellion. The request was granted 
and the next day army troops quashed the resistance, causing resentment among intellectuals and stu-
dents. The Kwangju uprising ended in severe repression and the slaughter of many people by the ruling 
military.
Later, with American approval, Chun quickly assumed the presidency through indirect elections by 
the National Conference for Unification. As the conference met in a Seoul gymnasium on 27 August 
1989, some cynics called Chun ‘the gymnasium president’ (Oh 1999: 109). It is obvious that the US at 
that time was more concerned with South Korea’s national security than with its democracy. The 
American approval of the new regime infuriated the Korean opposition and, subsequently, gave rise to 
anti-American sentiment. President Chun was elected for his first full term by a newly formed electoral 
college on 25 February 1981. Under the amended constitution Chun was to fill a single seven year term 
that would expire in early 1988. At that time the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) set the goal of 
laying a foundation for its second period of rule, clearly signalling the intention to pass the power to a 
man picked by DJP president Chun (ibid.). 
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The Transition Period
In early February 1985 Roh, Chun’s appointee as a head of the capital garrison command during the 
1979 coup, was made an assemblyman through a national constituency appointment by the ruling DJP, 
which also decided to elect its presidential candidate in a national party convention to be held in 1987. 
The DJP resolved on 23 February to name Roh party chairman, signalling his forthcoming designation 
as the party’s presidential candidate (ibid.). The election of Roh as president was a foregone conclusion 
until the accumulated and suppressed energies of a coalition of opposition political groups and the civil 
society seeking reforms and democratisation exploded cataclysmically in June 1987 when South Korean 
people took it to the streets to demand democratic changes.
When the Chun regime reluctantly allowed work on a new draft constitution to proceed in 1986, the 
ruling DJP advocated a parliamentary system while the opposition stood for a directly elected presidential 
system. At that time, American officials sided with the government by holding that the presidential 
system was not the only institution for democratic elections (Lee 1985: 84). After Chun declared on 
13 April 1987 that discussion on constitutional revision would be closed until after the Seoul Olympics, 
the US again seemed to be on his side. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Gaston Sigur 
supported the South Korean government’s position—the existing indirect presidential system—saying 
that ‘regardless of the method of balloting for president, a free and fair election should be the goal of all 
sides. The election laws are amenable to change without going through the difficult constitutional 
revision process’ (Kim 1989: 760).
In the direct presidential election held on 16 December 1987, Roh won with a plurality vote because 
his rivals, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, divided the opposition vote, just as Chun and Roh had 
calculated (Oh 1999: 110). Roh’s inauguration marked the first peaceful transition of presidential power 
in Korea since 1948. It contrasts with the turbulent experiences of the past: President Rhee of the First 
Republic was ousted from office through the student uprising of 1960; the Second Republic of Premier 
Chang was overthrown by the military coup led by Park in 1961; Park in turn was assassinated in 1979, 
and Chun had seized power through another coup in 1979. In his inaugural address, President Roh 
declared: ‘With launching of the new Republic, we will sail steadfastly toward democracy…’ (ibid.). The 
biggest question, however, was whether Roh, who was used to issuing orders and being instantly obeyed, 
would have the temperament to manage a democratic government. His task was further complicated by 
the National Assembly elections held on 26 April 1988 which produced a historic first in 40 years of 
Korean politics the ruling party with a minority of seats, 125 of 299—15 seats short of a simple majority 
(Bedeski 1994: 148). Opposition parties and independents, if united on certain issues, could now muster 
a healthy majority in the legislature, marking for the first time an era of what some pundits termed ‘a 
small ruling group, a larger opposition’ (Oh 1999: 112). Roh was a minority president and the National 
Assembly was divided among four parties, which also raised the question how efficient the new gov-
ernment would be. 
Civil Society and Demands for Democratisation
While the political, economic and military events in South Korea occupied the attention of many, 
there was a simultaneous growth in the emergence of a sizeable middle class, a potentially significant 
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social force. The roots of first social movements demanding democratic reforms date as far back as the 
1970s when the imposition in 1972 of the military regime by Park provided the spark that led to a loose 
alliance among political opposition organisations, religious groups, intellectuals, students and workers 
as well as human rights advocates. These groups were fairly autonomous in their own spheres until the 
loose alliance among them began to form a nationwide campaign, the ‘One million signature campaign 
for constitutional change’, in December 1973 (Bedeski 1994: 92). In addition, Catholic churches played 
a significant role in mobilising people. Evidently, Christians constituted an important group in the 
energised, autonomous, voluntary and self-supporting civil society bound by shared values. Many 
Christians (roughly 13 per cent of the total population in 1974) were better educated than the average 
Korean and many belonged to the politically conscious middle class which was responsive to the 
restoration of democracy. 
The anti-regime coalition, in which Christians played a considerable role, issued the ‘Democratic 
People’s Charter’ in 1975 and the ‘March First Democratic Declaration’ in 1978 (Oh 1999: 90). These 
declarations failed to impress the dictatorial Park regime, but did encourage an increasing number of 
citizens to join the ever-growing number of voluntary citizens’ organisations, enlarging and energising 
civil society. Groups that had been hitherto indifferent to political problems, including professionals, 
white-collar workers, factory managers, independent businesspeople and even low-ranking public 
bureaucrats, identified themselves with the goals of political democratisation. Those goals were advocated 
by the newly formed New Korean Democratic Party (NKDP), which became the largest opposition bloc 
in the National Assembly following the February 1985 elections. The NKDP was composed of the 
followers of the two best-known opposition leaders, Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young Sam, both Christians 
who had championed democratic reforms. A ‘grand alliance of civil society and political society against 
Chun’s authoritarian regime was finally formed’ (ibid.). 
Shortly after the shocking death of a Seoul National University student at the hands of police torture 
in January 1987, a survey by Seoul National University in May 1987 reported that 85.7 per cent of the 
middle class wanted to protect human rights even at the cost of economic growth (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, 
massive demonstrations were sustained in many urban centres in the spring of 1987 against the autocratic 
Chun regime. The demonstrators demanded democratisation and reform of Korean politics and gov-
ernment, and, for months, while the street demonstrators continued to battle the riot police, Chun ap-
peared amenable to the constitutional amendment idea. On 13 April 1987, however, he announced that 
he was reversing his public pledge to amend the constitution to allow a direct election to choose his 
successor. On 10 June 1987, his ruling party rubber-stamped the Roh candidacy for an indirect election 
to the president, thus causing a formation of a wide coalition of opposition and civil society demanding 
a constitutional amendment to allow a direct presidential election and a series of democratic reforms. 
The People’s March
Massive and often violent antigovernment demonstrations exploded simultaneously in Seoul and at least 
20 other cities and quickly spread in subsequent days to encompass 37 centres. Initially, the protestors 
were young students and workers, but what was surprising to both South Korean and international 
journalists alike was that older people also participated in these demonstrations. In the past, the middle 
class had kept its distance from the street clashes as long as the economy remained stable, but this time 
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they evidently decided to join the anti-regime struggle. Interestingly, in 1987, when these changes were 
occurring, all economic indicators were exceptionally strong; thus, it was not for economic reasons that 
the middle class was actively participating in these demonstrations. Its members, too, were now demand-
ing political reforms or democratisation, a term that had motivated numerous opposition leaders and 
students but apparently had little concrete meaning to the middle class until 1987, when ruthless dictator 
was no longer acceptable. 
The daily clashes between demonstrators and police occurred incessantly, and culminated in the 
‘Great Peace March of the People’ on 26 June. Countless demonstrators packed the highways and byways 
around Seoul and most urban centres that day, and the riot police suddenly were outnumbered and 
exhausted. The Chun regime’s defense against the Korean people began to crumble driving him into 
desperation to use the military against the populace. 
At that point, South Korea was on a precipice, facing an unprecedentedly bloody massacre of the 
people by its military—unleashed by the Chun regime, born on the heel of the Kwangju massacre—and 
the possibility of another coup toppling the regime. However, Chun’s advisors counseled him not to fire 
on the people. It was under these circumstances that Roh Tae Woo, the ruling party’s presidential can-
didate, drafted a decidedly conciliatory declaration of ‘democratization and reform’ (Bedeski 1994: 112). 
This was a well timed and politically adroit move that defused at the very last moment the explosive 
demands of the public and helped avoid a humiliating political defeat for himself. However, it was Chun 
who first decided to fake surrender to the massive demand, for a direct presidential election could no 
longer be resisted in the face of tidal waves of angry demonstrators (Oh 1999: 94). The major changes 
introduced by Roh were the direct presidential election system, amnesty and restoration of civil rights for 
dissidents, strengthening all basic human rights, promoting freedom of the press and bold social reforms 
to build a clean and honest society. 
Olympic Factor in Korea
The first formal Olympic proposal had been forwarded to the IOC in 1979, shortly before the assassination 
of President Park Chung Hee. ‘It was said if we hosted the Olympics, it would move the country ahead 
by 10 years,’ recalls Korean Olympic Committee vice-president Choy Man Lip (McBeth 1988: 59). 
After Park’s assassination, however, the Olympic idea seemed destined to die with him. However, despite 
continuing opposition, then education minister Lee Ho went to President Chun in early 1981, with a 
favourable recommendation. Chun made a decision and in March the strong-minded former general gave 
the go-ahead, saying it would be an unacceptable declaration of weakness if the plan was allowed to 
lapse. 
To implement Chun’s decision to bring the Olympiad to Korea, somebody had to be put in charge of 
the high-profile task of getting the games to come to Seoul. Diverting the people’s attention to the 
Olympics and away from politics was a clever ploy by the Chun regime due to the fact that his regime 
was widely perceived as illegitimate. Because the games were vital to South Korean prestige and 
the regime’s credibility, political interference or the collapse of the government and subsequent failure 
to host them would have been a major embarrassment. Therefore, the student dissidents and the 
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increasingly disaffected middle class possessed a powerful hostage in the Olympics. Without considerable 
concessions to democratic reform, the government would possibly have lost the privilege of holding the 
games in the face of potential massive disorder. 
In the Chun cabinet a new ministry of athletics was created and Roh was appointed its first minister. 
As the spectacular interest in hosting the international sports for the first time in Korean history was 
heightened by the Chun regime, the mass media spotlight was redirected towards Roh (Bedeski 1994: 
147). When the IOC hesitated to bring the games to Seoul because it feared political instability in the 
Korean peninsula, Roh took a highly publicised trip to Switzerland to ask its member to reconsider, and 
South Korea later had the immense pride in hosting the international games. 
Conclusion 
It is quite evident that the authoritarian government of Chun Doo Hwan attempted to use the Olympics 
to legitimise his rule and, perhaps, to clamp down an internal dissent in the name of stability. Undeniably, 
South Korea had a miserable human rights record at the time it was awarded the Olympics. During the 
run-up period to win the right to host the Olympics, dissidents frequently decried the games for the 
succor they gave to Chun and his government. 
The important fact is that South Korea’s march towards democracy had begun in earnest at the end of 
1980s. The Olympics bought Korea at least 12 months of relative immunity from a political crackdown 
at a time when its embryonic democracy desperately needed some breathing room. Although an unpre-
cedented wave of strikes broke out, a brutal crackdown was not a viable option for the government any-
more given the enormous size of opposition. The Seoul Olympic played a pivotal role in bringing some 
democratic reforms to South Korea only because intensifying world scrutiny made it difficult for the 
government to deal harshly with those demanding democratic reforms.
This study thus far has tried to show how the Seoul Olympic Games might have contributed to 
hastening of the political reforms in South Korea. In the process, the democratic movements such as the 
‘Great Peace March of the People’ that followed Chun’s intransigent statement regarding democratic 
reforms should be rendered an important role in the contemporary Korean history. On the other hand, the 
Seoul Olympic Games acted as a factor, which facilitated these political processes. As indicated earlier, 
the Seoul Olympiad played a significant role in bringing some democratic reforms to South Korea. 
Faced with legitimation crisis, especially after the tragic Kwangju incident, Chun’s regime opted for the 
Olympic idea to evade the crisis by manipulating the Olympic issues. However, such manipulation failed 
to calm down Korean people’s desire for democracy and the Olympics proved to be more than Chun had 
bargained for as he underestimated the strength of the pro-democratic forces. In addition, by hosting the 
Seoul Olympic Games, the nation had exposed itself to worldwide attention and scrutiny. 
Some might argue that a strong causal link between the games and the democratic transition did not 
exist. Indeed, it would be challenging to prove a clear causal mechanism if there is a relation. It is hard 
to disprove the statement that hosting the Olympic Games merely coincided with a shift away from 
Chun’s authoritarian rule in South Korea. 
Nonetheless, the findings of this article demonstrate that the Olympic Games served as a catalyst 
accelerating democratic changes. First, Chun’s motive behind getting the right to host the games was to 
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divert attention from his illegitimate rule, as we saw earlier. Second, given Chun’s brutal response to the 
Kwangju uprising, it is problematic to envisage how he would have responded to the commotions if 
South Korea were not to host the Olympic Games. 
Before and after the curtain was raised in the Olympic Games, the public’s exploding desire for 
democracy was the decisive factor precipitating political change. In Mexico’s case, two months before 
the opening of the Olympic Games, the desire for democracy intensified but the games became hostage 
to that desire, and the middle class could not sit by and disregard government’s iron-fist rule and 
oppressive measures which resulted in bloodshed. In South Korea, however, such desires exploded 15 
months before the Olympics, and there was enough leeway to avoid the games becoming absolute 
hostage. Consequently, the middle class as well as students created a national consensus on democratisation 
and on desire for a successful Olympiad, thereby applying pressure on the politicians forcing them to 
reluctantly make ‘correct’ decisions. A national accord arose recognising that the failure to successfully 
host the games would bring upon the nation a loss of face and political leaders had to realise that un-
successful Olympics would inflict grave political and diplomatic blows to the whole country. 
Conclusion: Apolitical Olympics? 
What, then, can we deduce from the Mexico and South Korea analogies? They may appear less practical 
after considering the vast differences between Mexico and South Korea. Yet, we can make certain con-
clusions about Olympic Games taking into account the lessons of the Mexican and South Korean 
models. 
First, the Olympic Games have been and are used as a political tool for various purposes. As we saw 
earlier, specific political circumstances eventually influenced the selection of Mexico’s and South 
Korea’s priorities for national development. Although demonstrations intensified just two months before 
the Olympic Games in Mexico City, one year and three months before the Seoul Olympic Games, the 
South Korean people’s desire for democratisation intensified and the Korean government reluctantly 
committed itself to democratic reforms. Conversely, the Mexican government, committed to maintaining 
law and order so that the Olympic Games could open, used force to suppress anti-government demon-
strations, which resulted in more than 200 tragic deaths and more than 1,000 wounded. Hosting of the 
Olympic Games in Mexico and South Korea triggered concatenate events and changes shaped by an 
intricate set of unique political, economic, cultural and social circumstances. These differences between 
Mexico and South Korea account for the diverse effects of the Olympic Games on the respective 
countries.
Although this research model works well to analyse post-fact the role the Olympic Games played 
in the selected countries, there are limitations to the extent this heuristic model can be applied to analyse 
the political implications of future Olympic Games. Using Mexico’s and South Korea’s experiences as a 
template for the future games taking place in non-democracies is likely to be limited due to certain 
factors. One of the main reasons is that shifts from authoritarian one-party rule are amazingly complex 
processes as many aspects come into play. One thing we can say about the experiences of countries that 
have relatively recently undergone moves away from one-party rule is that these have been dissimilar, to 
say the least. Also, of the aforementioned countries, only Mexico hosted the Olympic Games while it 
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was a one-party state. Far from taking place soon after the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, the dissolution 
of the ruling party’s monopoly on power came more than two decades later.
However, there is great value in analysing the political effects of the Olympic Games after the fact and 
some basic theoretical expectations can be presumed. As seen in this article, a fascinating picture emerges 
showing how Olympic Games can play a major political role in a country’s political development. We 
can assume that the Olympic Games taking place in non-democracies will become highly politicised 
domestically and internationally. The Beijing Olympic Games of 2008 illustrate this point. Despite inter-
national pressure, the Chinese Communist Party pointed to the games as a factor to legitimise and sustain 
their continued monopoly on political power. We need to remain realistic about the positive impact the 
Olympic Games can have on the non-democratic host countries. Positive change in China or anywhere 
will not happen simply because of the Olympic Games. The Chinese government has staunchly opposed 
any anti-Beijing protest movements and does not appear to be losing its power. International institutions, 
non-governmental organisations and foreign governments should work together with their counterparts 
in the host states, and via the Olympic process, attempt to bring the changes in the country under the 
auspices of such a major international event. 
In the end, moving between Mexico in 1968 and South Korea in 1988 can help analyse certain 
phenomena, but the lesson is less apposite to contemplate the visions of the games compelling non-
democratic host countries to make democratic changes. The greatest value of the historical examples is 
often to raise difficult questions about consistency or lack thereof in one’s approach to international 
affairs.
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